For the claim that the satisfaction of certain conditions is sufficient for the application of some concept to serve as part of the (`reductive') analysis of that concept, we require the conditions to be specified without employing that very concept. An account of the application conditions of a concept not meeting this requirement, we call analytically circular. For such a claim to be usable in determining the extension of the concept, however, such circularity may not matter, since if the concept (...) figures in a certain kind of intensional context in the specification of the conditions, the satisfaction of those conditions may not itself depend on the extension of the concept. We put this by saying that although analytically circular, the account may yet not be inferentially circular. (shrink)

We consider the modal logic of non-contingency in a general setting, without making special assumptions about the accessibility relation. The basic logic in this setting is axiomatized, and some of its extensions are discussed, with special attention to the expressive weakness of the language whose sole modal primitive is non-contingency , by comparison with the usual language based on necessity.

An analogy between functional dependencies and implicational formulas of sentential logic has been discussed in the literature. We feel that a somewhat different connexion between dependency theory and sentential logic is suggested by the similarity between Armstrong's axioms for functional dependencies and Tarski's defining conditions for consequence relations, and we pursue aspects of this other analogy here for their theoretical interest. The analogy suggests, for example, a different semantic interpretation of consequence relations: instead of thinking ofB as a consequence of (...) a set of formulas {A1,...,A n} whenB is true on every assignment of truth-values on which eachA i is true, we can think of this relation as obtaining when every pair of truth-value assignments which give the same truth-values toA 1, the same truth-values toA 2,..., and the same truth-values toA n, also make the same assignment in respect ofB. We describe the former as the consequence relation inference-determined by the class of truth-value assignments (valuations) under consideration, and the latter as the consequence relation supervenience-determined by that class of assignments. Some comparisons will be made between these two notions. (shrink)

Several intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions amongst properties, current in the literature, are discussed and contrasted. The proponents of such distinctions tend to present them as competing, but it is suggested here that at least three of the relevant distinctions (including here that between non-relational and relational properties) arise out of separate perfectly legitimate intuitive considerations: though of course different proposed explications of the informal distinctions involved in any one case may well conflict. Special attention is paid to the question of whether a (...) single notion of property is capable of supporting the various distinctions. (shrink)

An account of desire as a species of belief may owe its appeal to the details of its proposal as to precisely what sort of beliefs desires are to be identified with, and its downfall may be due to those details it does provide. For example, it may be proposed that the desire that α is in fact the belief that it ought to be that α, or is morally good or desirable that it should be the case that α. (...) Here the appeal might be that of forging a link between the holding of a moral belief and the acknowledgment that one has a reason for acting a certain way; and the shortcoming of the suggestion is its evident implausibility: even if the ‘necessity’ direction could be established, having a desire hardly seems sufficient for the holding of any such belief. Again: it might be proposed, perhaps simply to bring some order into the realm of propositional attitudes by reducing some to others, that the belief with which we should identify a’s desire that α is a’s belief that he will or would be happy if α. This proposed identification can be seen to be incorrect by consideration of examples such as the following, due to J. Gosling. An aging and ailing parent might forego numerous pleasures in order that his children should reap the benefits of his saving and have a good start in life – perhaps by receiving an expensive education – after his impending death. Oearly he may want that they should so benefit even if he does not believe in an after-death existence in which he might come to know of, and so take pleasure in, his children’s subsequent well-being. So his wanting that they should prosper cannot consist in his believing that he will be happy if/when they do, since he has no expectation of even being in existence in that eventuality. As Gosling puts it, there is a clear difference between thinking that something’s coming about will bring one pleasure, on the one hand, and viewing the prospect of its coming about with pleasure, on the other. (shrink)

SummaryIf you know you can recognise positive instances of a property, can you use this knowledge so as to be able to recognise also its negative instances? This is the question to be adressed.

Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.

A purported axiomatization, by P. Gärdenfors, of intuitionistic propositional logic is shown to be incomplete, and that the mistaken claim to completeness is seen to result from carelessness in the choice of primitive logical vocabulary. This leads to a consideration of various ways of conceiving the distinction between primitive and defined vocabularies, along with the bearing of these differences on such matters as are discussed in connection with Gärdenfors.

The literature on critical thinking (CT) in counselling and therapy generally posits higher quality outcomes when CT is applied in therapeutic treatment. We critically examine support for the claim that CT improves clinical outcomes. The purported effects of CT are first identified by arguments in favour of using CT in therapeutic treatment, both in terms of its general efficacy and with regard to its applicability in professional counselling. We then underscore limitations in the current literature, highlighting mainly a gap between (...) theory and practice. Overall, our results suggest that available evidence provides primarily inferential, rather than direct, support for the claim that CT positively influences therapy outcomes. We close the paper by proposing research questions to guide further empirical investigation. (shrink)

We illustrate, with three examples, the interaction between boolean and modal connectives by looking at the role of truth-functional reasoning in the provision of completeness proofs for normal modal logics. The first example (§ 1) is of a logic (more accurately: range of logics) which is incomplete in the sense of being determined by no class of Kripke frames, where the incompleteness is entirely due to the lack of boolean negation amongst the underlying non-modal connectives. The second example (§ 2) (...) focusses on the breakdown, in the absence of boolean disjunction, of the usual canonical model argument for the logic of dense Kripke frames, though a proof of incompleteness with respect to the Kripke semantics is not offered. An alternative semantic account is developed, in terms of which a completeness proof can be given, and this is used (§ 3) in the discussion of the third example, a bimodal logic which is, as with the first example, provably incomplete in terms of the Kripke semantics, the incompleteness being due to the lack of disjunction (as a primitive or defined boolean connective). (shrink)

Hegel was one of the philosophers, who seemingly paid only little attention to the conceptual problems of aetiology. The paper deals especially with those parts of his work, in which Hegel sheds light particularly on these problems. It examines a evaluates Hegel's conception of interconnection between entities such as reality, essence, necessity, appearance and causality . A special attention is paid to the question of "causa sui" as inherently related to the problem of mutual causation. The paper shows many methodological (...) dangers as well as the lessons, we can still draw from Hegel's aetiological reflections. (shrink)

This essay is a critical theological and pastoral study of the Working Document of the Second African Synod. The article engages the articles in the document which deal with the theme of reconciliation. This essay begins by exploring the Christological and ecclesiological foundations for an African theology of reconciliation as found in the working document. While engaging the significant aspects of the working document which relate to articulating an African theology of reconciliation, this essay shows the limitations of the document (...) in its historical and cultural analysis of the situation in Africa. Drawing from a phenomenological hermeneutical engagement with African history, cultural grammar, and Christ-centered African Christian imagination, the essay widens the scope of theological engagement with the task of reconciliation in Africa. It does a theological aesthetics of reconciliation in Africa, by integrating diverse cultural, ontological, and Christological symbols within the African world on vital participation and vital union. Through the inculturation of vital participation as analogous to Trinitarian Communion, the essay shows how the Church in Africa can deal with the ever-revolving cycle of violence, conflicts, and divisions in the churches and political institutions which have all hampered the mission of building relationship and God's kingdom in Africa. The essay concludes by recommending four pastoral approaches through which the Catholic Church in Africa can be both a reconciled community and an instrument for reconciliation in Africa. (shrink)

The totality of extensional 1-ary connectives distinguishable in a logical framework allowing sequents with multiple or empty (alongside singleton) succedents form a lattice under a natural partial ordering relating one connective to another if all the inferential properties of the former are possessed by the latter. Here we give a complete description of that lattice; its Hasse diagram appears as Figure 1 in §2. Simple syntactic descriptions of the lattice elements are provided in §3; §§4 and 5 give some additional (...) remarks on matrix methods and on alternative terminology. Background: The size of this lattice was underestimated in [3]; some missing cases were noted in [4] in the course of correcting an example from [3] purporting to show the non-distributivity of the lattice. All the 'missing cases' (as well as those originally noted) are covered here. (The present discussion is self-contained.). (shrink)